London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine supports India’s response to Nipah virus outbreak

Editorial Team SDG3
11 minutes ago
5 min read

Amid renewed alarm over the Nipah virus (NiV) outbreak in West Bengal, India, the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) has reaffirmed its position as one of the world’s foremost centres for infectious disease research and epidemiological analysis. The institution’s rapid and evidence-based engagement underscores the importance of independent global health monitoring at a time when the threat of zoonotic spillovers continues to test international preparedness systems.

lshtm’s expert analysis and monitoring

On 28 January 2026, LSHTM’s experts, led by Dr Kaja Abbas, Associate Professor of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, issued a rapid reaction analysis assessing the scale and implications of the outbreak. Their evaluation focused on the virus’s severe respiratory and neurological symptoms, combined with its high fatality rate of between 40 and 75 per cent.

The institution is actively examining the effectiveness of India’s containment response, particularly the quarantining of contacts and the establishment of isolation wards. Although the overall risk beyond the affected area remains low, LSHTM researchers have endorsed enhanced airport screening in neighbouring nations, including Thailand and Malaysia, as a prudent preventive measure.

Rapid deployment and global response capability

A key operational element of LSHTM’s response lies in its joint management of the UK Public Health Rapid Support Team, a specialised unit co-run with the UK government. The team is capable of deploying within 48 hours to assist nations during infectious disease crises, providing expert epidemiologists, clinicians and infection control specialists to strengthen local health systems.

Research integration and predictive modelling

Through its Centre for Epidemic Preparedness and Response, LSHTM integrates mathematical modelling with anthropological research to understand how pathogens like Nipah spread from animals to humans. This interdisciplinary approach enables policymakers to anticipate transmission routes and design culturally sensitive containment strategies before outbreaks escalate.

A global research network

With a presence in more than 100 countries and dedicated research sites in The Gambia and Uganda, LSHTM maintains a broad scientific footprint across Africa and Asia. Its annual research income, exceeding £190 million, supports a pipeline of translational studies that convert laboratory discoveries into practical global health policy. The institution’s role as a WHO collaborating centre further allows it to validate the effectiveness of local containment measures in collaboration with regional authorities.

Strengthening future preparedness

The West Bengal outbreak has again highlighted the urgency of robust epidemic intelligence and the interconnectedness of global health systems. LSHTM’s ongoing contribution represents a model for sustainable, science-led collaboration aligned with SDG 3 on health and well-being.

Understanding nipah virus origins, transmission, severity and the real level of risk in west bengal and beyond

What exactly is nipah virus

Nipah virus is a henipavirus that causes severe respiratory and neurological disease in humans. Its natural reservoirs are fruit bats of the Pteropus genus, and spillover to people has occurred via contaminated food such as raw date-palm sap, direct bat exposure, or through intermediate animals like pigs. The incubation period is typically 4 to 14 days, occasionally longer. There is no licensed vaccine or specific antiviral, so clinical care is supportive.

What we know about the west bengal event

Authorities reported two infections in health workers in West Bengal, with contact tracing of roughly 200 people yielding negative results to date. Regional travel hubs introduced airport screening and health declarations for arrivals from affected areas. While vigilance is high, there is no evidence of wider spread beyond the initial cluster.

On 28 January 2026, LSHTM issued a rapid reaction noting severe respiratory and neurological symptoms and the historically high case fatality rate of 40 to 75 per cent observed in previous outbreaks, and it highlighted the prudence of temporary screening measures in neighbouring countries.

Where the virus comes from and how it spreads

Evidence points to zoonotic spillover from bat populations in South and South-East Asia, with documented outbreaks in Malaysia and Singapore in 1998 to 1999, and recurrent events since in Bangladesh and India. Person-to-person transmission is possible but usually requires close, unprotected contact in households or healthcare settings, which explains disproportionate risk to health workers and caregivers without stringent infection prevention and control.

The numbers that matter and sources

severity: across outbreaks, reported fatality has ranged from roughly 40 to 75 per cent, varying by setting and access to critical care, with some survivors experiencing lasting neurological problems.
incubation: commonly 4 to 14 days, occasionally longer.
current event: two confirmed cases in West Bengal, about 196 contacts monitored, none positive to date in public reports.

Sensible risk analysis for readers

Outside the immediate affected districts of West Bengal, the risk is low on current evidence. Nipah does not spread easily through casual contact or brief community encounters. The principal risk is close, unprotected exposure to symptomatic individuals or contaminated biological material in homes or clinics. With early infection-control measures, clusters tend to be short-lived and self-limiting.

Higher-impact risks concentrate among frontline staff and family caregivers if personal protective equipment, cohorting and isolation capacity are insufficient. Screening at ports of entry is a useful precaution that raises clinical suspicion and speeds isolation of symptomatic travellers, but containment depends on rapid case finding, high-quality clinical care and clear public messaging that discourages panic and misinformation.

How lshtm fits into real-world preparedness

Beyond analysis, LSHTM co-runs the UK Public Health Rapid Support Team, designed to deploy multidisciplinary outbreak specialists at about 48 hours’ notice to support countries on request. Its Centre for Epidemic Preparedness and Response blends mathematical modelling with field insights to anticipate spillover pathways and tailor culturally appropriate interventions.

What is in the pipeline on vaccines and treatments

There is no approved human vaccine yet, but several candidates, including vector-based and mRNA approaches, are in early clinical development. Monoclonal antibody candidates, notably m102.4, have Phase 1 safety data and are being advanced with product-development partnerships. In future outbreaks, such countermeasures could be used under emergency protocols while larger trials proceed.

Practical takeaways for the public and travellers

follow local health guidance, seek care promptly for persistent fever, severe headache or breathing difficulty, disclose recent travel or healthcare exposure
health workers should reinforce droplet and contact precautions, use appropriate PPE, and apply strict triage and isolation for suspected cases
communities should avoid raw date-palm sap and reduce contact with sick animals where practices make this relevant

Further reading: who prevention basics

Well-calibrated outbreak control safeguards livelihoods as well as lives by avoiding blanket restrictions that disproportionately affect lower-income families. Investment in early detection, primary-care surge and transparent risk communication aligns with SDG 3 on health and well-being.

For broader context and ongoing updates: