Solar surge in Africa promises and pitfalls of a greener economy

Solar surge in Africa promises and pitfalls of a greener economy : Photo: CHUTTERSNAP

Africa’s solar moment is finally visible in the data. Panel imports jumped by around 60% in the 12 months to June 2025, to roughly 15 GW of modules, a sharp pick-up from a very low base. Yet the continent added only about 4.2 GW of renewable capacity in 2024 and still leaves more than 600 million people without electricity. The green economy is stirring, but the stakes are whether this surge creates decent local jobs, robust environmental safeguards and genuine African ownership of supply chains, or simply reproduces old dependencies in cleaner colours.

Why the solar push matters

Done well, solar can lower bills, cut diesel use, and expand access at speed, aligning most directly with SDG 7. Mini-grids and rooftop systems already show practical gains, with developers reporting more than 600 commissioned mini-grids and close to one million people connected, while global analysis points to installations in 2024 being about six times higher than in 2018. Africa’s headline parks, such as Egypt’s Benban complex near Aswan at roughly 1.4 to 1.8 GW, demonstrate that large utility projects can be built in tough conditions.

The jobs question

The employment dividend is real but uneven. Globally, renewables supported about 16.2 million jobs in 2023, with solar PV accounting for roughly 7 million. Africa’s share remains modest, reflecting limited manufacturing and the stop-start tempo of projects. Studies suggest the wider green economy could create millions of African jobs by 2030, most of them in renewables and related services, if training and localisation ramp up. Right now, many developers still struggle to hire technicians and site managers, indicating a persistent skills gap that slows roll-outs and weakens local value capture.

Financing reality, not rhetoric

The binding constraint is the cost of capital. Even bankable projects stumble when debt is priced in the teens and local currency risk is high. Fresh analysis from the IEA and others underlines how concessional finance and risk-mitigation tools can unlock pipelines in countries such as Kenya and Senegal, but these mechanisms are not yet available at the necessary scale. Put simply, without cheaper money, imports will rise but installations, grid connections and local supply chains will lag.

Who owns the supply chain

Imports will dominate in the near term, particularly from China, which leads every step from polysilicon to modules. There are green shoots of African manufacturing — Morocco has announced plans for a multi-gigawatt module plant, and South Africa is using local-content rules in procurement to rebuild assembly — but the region still relies on foreign equipment and tooling. Building competitive clusters will require predictable demand, stable procurement, and targeted incentives within the AfCFTA framework to achieve scale.

Environmental safeguards at both ends of the chain

Clean energy is not impact-free. Large solar parks raise land and biodiversity concerns that demand prior consultation, fair compensation and cumulative-impact assessment. Upstream, ethical risks are sharper. Cobalt from the DRC still carries documented labour rights abuses, and parts of the global polysilicon chain have faced forced-labour scrutiny. As Africa expands solar, procurement policies, corporate due diligence and independent audits must filter out abuse, otherwise the transition hard-wires injustice into a supposedly sustainable system.

On the ground, what work and where

Near-term job growth clusters in installation, operations and maintenance, civil works, electrical balance-of-plant, and mini-grid services. Upgrading to higher value segments — glass, frames, inverters, cells — depends on firm power for factories, logistics improvements, and regional demand visibility. Public tenders that reward quality, local training and after-sales support, not just the lowest bid, can shift outcomes. Anchor-offtaker models for industrial zones and agricultural processing hubs help create weekday daytime load so projects are bankable without excessive subsidies.

Avoiding a new dependency

The green boom will be judged not only by megawatts but by ownership. Three practical tests stand out:

1.     finance, whether African developers can secure patient, affordable capital rather than acting as local agents for overseas owners; 2) capabilities, whether domestic firms win EPC, O&M and component contracts at scale; 3) safeguards, whether labour rights and environmental standards travel with every watt, from mine to module to mini-grid. Meeting these tests would turn a spike in imports into a durable industrial strategy.

What to do next

·       cut capital costs, expand currency hedging and guarantees for distributed and utility solar, prioritising local developers and mini-grids; see the IEA Cost of Capital Observatory and AMDA’s benchmarking for practical levers.

·       link procurement to skills, require accredited training and apprenticeships, and measure outcomes, not inputs.

·       build regional manufacturing where competitive, starting with frames, junction boxes and mounting systems, then scaling to modules as demand aggregates, as early moves in Morocco and South Africa indicate.

·       hard-wire responsible sourcing, using enforceable contractual clauses and independent audits for cobalt, copper and polysilicon.

Africa’s solar surge is the start of a story, not the end. If the continent seizes control of finance, skills and standards, the new power systems can expand access, create decent work and reduce exposure to fuel price shocks. If not, the transition risks importing equipment, exporting value, and repeating the very dependencies the renewable energy transition was meant to end.

Further reading, policy trackers and data

·       Ember on Africa’s solar import spike. (ember-energy.org)

·       IRENA renewable capacity and jobs datasets. (irena.org)

·       IEA commentary on cutting the cost of capital in Africa. (IEA)

·       Africa Minigrid Developers Association benchmarking. (africamda.org)