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Critical minerals are reshaping the clean energy transition and global power

Critical minerals are reshaping the clean energy transition and global power
Critical minerals are reshaping the clean energy transition and global power | Photo: Omid Roshan

Published on 8 May 2026 at 00:01 GMT

By Editorial Team SDG12

 


The clean energy transition is increasingly being built from the ground up, through lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, graphite and rare earth elements extracted from mines that sit at the centre of a new geopolitical contest. As governments race to expand electric vehicles, batteries, solar power, wind turbines and electricity grids, critical minerals have become a test of whether climate action can avoid repeating older patterns of resource extraction, environmental harm and unequal value distribution.

 

Critical minerals now sit at the centre of climate policy. The issue is no longer only about whether the world can deploy enough renewable energy technologies. It is also about who controls supply chains, who bears the ecological and social costs of extraction, and whether mineral-rich countries and local communities receive a fair share of the benefits.

 

The International Energy Agency has reported strong recent growth in demand for key energy transition minerals, with clean energy technologies becoming a major driver of mineral markets. Lithium demand has risen sharply because of batteries, while nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earth elements are increasingly tied to electric vehicles, grid storage and low-carbon infrastructure. Copper, often less visible in public debate, is also central because it underpins electrification and power networks.

 

This demand is creating a strategic map that differs from the fossil fuel era but does not escape its logic. Oil and gas geopolitics centred on pipelines, shipping lanes and producer cartels. Critical minerals geopolitics is more dispersed, involving mines, refining capacity, processing technology, industrial policy, trade restrictions, environmental permits and diplomatic partnerships. The new competition is not only for raw materials, but for control of value chains.

 

China’s position in processing and refining has made many governments anxious about supply security. The United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia and others have moved to build alternative partnerships and domestic capacity. These efforts are often presented as resilience measures, but they also risk turning mineral access into another arena of strategic rivalry, especially when poorer producer countries are treated mainly as sources of supply.

 

For mineral-rich countries, the moment presents opportunity and risk. Indonesia has sought to use its nickel reserves to attract battery and electric vehicle investment. Chile and Argentina are important to lithium supply. The Democratic Republic of the Congo remains central to cobalt. Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are significant to copper. Several African, Latin American and Asian governments are pressing for more local processing, industrialisation and jobs rather than exporting raw ore at low margins.

 

Producer countries are demanding more than extraction. Their argument is straightforward, minerals needed for the global energy transition should support development, not simply leave behind pollution, land conflict and limited public revenue. This has placed value addition, taxation, contract transparency and domestic manufacturing at the heart of the debate.

 

The challenge is that moving up the value chain is difficult. Processing plants require reliable electricity, transport infrastructure, capital, technical skills and environmental safeguards. Countries with heavy debt burdens may also face pressure to approve projects quickly, sometimes before governance systems are strong enough to manage social and ecological risks. A fairer minerals economy will therefore depend not only on investment, but on regulation, community consent, public accountability and long-term industrial planning.

 

Mining communities are often first to feel the costs. Land acquisition, water use, waste disposal, pollution risks and pressure on local livelihoods can create serious tensions. In some regions, Indigenous peoples and rural communities argue that climate goals are being used to justify rapid extraction without meaningful participation. The result can be a troubling contradiction, clean energy technologies intended to reduce global emissions may rely on supply chains that deepen local injustice.

 

Civil society organisations have therefore pushed for stronger safeguards. Publish What You Pay, Natural Resource Governance Institute, Amnesty International, Earthworks and Global Witness have all contributed to scrutiny of mineral governance, corporate accountability, transparency, human rights and environmental standards. Their work reflects a wider concern that transition minerals should not become a loophole in responsible development.

 

The issue is closely linked to SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), because minerals are needed for technologies that can expand low-carbon power. It also connects to SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production), SDG 13 (climate action) and SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions). These links matter because the transition will be judged not only by emissions reductions, but by how fairly and transparently its material foundations are governed.

 

A faster transition cannot mean weaker rights. Climate urgency is real, but speed can become a justification for shortcuts. Poorly governed extraction can damage water systems, worsen corruption, displace communities or entrench unsafe labour conditions. At the same time, blocking all new mining without reducing demand for materials would leave unresolved the question of how to build grids, batteries and renewable infrastructure at the scale required.

 

This is where the debate becomes more complex than a simple choice between mining and no mining. Demand can be reduced through better public transport, smaller and more efficient vehicles, battery recycling, product durability, circular economy policies and more responsible consumption in wealthy economies. Recycling will not immediately replace new extraction, because the first generation of clean energy infrastructure is still being built, but it can reduce pressure over time.

 

Demand reduction is a fairness issue. If high-income countries pursue mineral-intensive consumption patterns while low-income producer countries carry the social and environmental burden, the transition may reproduce global inequality. A just approach would ask not only how to secure more minerals, but how to use fewer of them where possible, share technology, support local industry and improve public revenue management.

 

The United Nations has recognised the risks through its work on critical energy transition minerals, including calls for a just, fair and sustainable transition that benefits countries and communities where minerals are found. This matters because mineral supply chains cross borders, and voluntary corporate commitments alone are unlikely to resolve disputes over land rights, tax avoidance, environmental damage or unequal bargaining power.

 

Trade policy is becoming another pressure point. Export controls, subsidies, local content rules and strategic partnerships can help countries build domestic industries, but they can also intensify tensions if they are used mainly by powerful economies to secure preferential access. For developing countries, the danger is being asked to keep markets open while richer states subsidise their own manufacturers and capture the most profitable parts of the supply chain.

 

Fair value distribution is becoming a central climate demand. This includes more transparent contracts, stronger tax systems, anti-corruption measures, community benefit agreements, worker protections, environmental monitoring and support for domestic processing where it is economically and ecologically viable. It also includes recognising that not all mining projects should proceed if consent, environmental safety or public benefit cannot be demonstrated.

 

Companies face growing scrutiny as well. Automakers, battery producers, renewable energy firms and technology companies increasingly claim to support responsible sourcing. Those claims are difficult to verify without traceable supply chains, independent audits, public reporting and consequences for abuses. Certification schemes can help, but they are not substitutes for law, enforcement and community power.

 

The clean energy transition needs minerals, but it also needs legitimacy. Without trust, projects can face protests, litigation, delays and conflict. Without fairness, mineral-rich countries may see another wave of extraction in which raw materials leave and wealth accumulates elsewhere. Without environmental safeguards, the transition risks undermining the very public interest it is meant to serve.

 

The central question is therefore not whether critical minerals are necessary. In many cases, they are. The question is whether the world can build mineral supply chains that are compatible with climate goals, human rights and development justice. That will require producer countries to strengthen governance, consumer countries to reduce wasteful demand, companies to accept higher standards, and international institutions to support rules that do not leave communities behind.

 

The minerals race will shape the politics of decarbonisation. It will influence alliances, trade disputes, industrial policy and the credibility of climate action. If handled narrowly as a security contest, it may deepen extraction pressure and mistrust. If governed as a shared development challenge, it could help make the energy transition cleaner, fairer and more durable.

 

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